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Abstract 
This paper critically analyses the foundations of three widely advocated information security 
management standards (BS7799, GASPP and SSE-CMM). The analysis reveals several 
fundamental problems related to these standards, casting serious doubts on their validity. 
The implications for research and practice, in improving information security management 
standards, are considered.  
Keywords 
Information security management standards 
Introduction 
Security aspects have been neglected in information systems (IS)/software development 
methods (Baskerville 1993, Dhillon & Backhouse 2001). To overcome this weakness, several 
IS security methods have been proposed (Baskerville 1993, Dhillon & Backhouse 2001, 
Dhillon 1997, Siponen, 2001). Of these methods, security checklists and management 
standards (classified as normative management-oriented security standards) are widely used 
(Parker 1998, Eloff & Solms 2000a, b, Solms & Haar 2000). In fact, IS security journals, 
including Computers & Security, Information Systems Security, Information Management & 
Computer Security, and information security management conference proceedings (e.g., 
annual IFIP TC11), are saturated with articles by security practitioners and academics paying 
lip service to the various existing standards; see, for example, Eloff and Solms (2000b), 
Ferris (1994), Ferraiolo and Sachs (1996), Fitzgerald (1995), Hardy (1995), Hopkinson 
(2001), Pounder (1999) and Solms (1996, 1998, 1999). To boot, many even view these 
standards as the key issue in the business of security management (Eloff & Solms 2000a, 
Janczewski 2000). In the background, protests have been heard. Baskerville (1993) criticized 
checklists for not paying enough attention to the fact that organizations’ security requirements 
differ. Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) see checklists as mechanistic and therefore as not 
paying adequate attention to the social nature of organizations. We would apply these 
objections to checklists equally to standards. With respect to standards, Parker (1998, p. 214-
215) criticized GASSP (1993) as “folk art“ for failing to include the viewpoints of deterrence 
and sanctions.  
Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that we have not encountered any attempts by advocates of 
standards/checklists to reply to these criticisms. Given that one of the key elements of 
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academic research is its “self-corrective method” (Chalmers 1982, Niiniluoto 1990, 1999, 
Popper 1992), it is imperative that we offer constructive criticism to some of our colleagues 
in the academy, insofar they have failed to accomplish this important objective of scientific 
research. The purpose of this paper is to extend and deepen these criticisms by exploring 
specific problems of selected management-oriented information security standards; and, on 
the basis of this analysis, offering suggestions on how things may be improved.  
This research effort is worthwhile for several reasons. First, scholars should be aware of the 
underlying theoretical foundations of different methods (e.g., Dhillon 1997, Dhillon & 
Backhouse 2001, Hirschheim et al. 1995), and particularly their possible weaknesses. As 
Lakatos put it: “monolithical domination or dogmatic acceptance of a paradigm is a symptom 
of pseudoscience…" (Metaxopoulus 1989, p. 204). Second, it is common knowledge that we 
humans reflect the different beliefs and kinds of knowledge imparted to us through our 
upbringing and education or acquired by personal experience (e.g., Hare 1952). Therefore, it 
is important to analyze critically the underlying assumptions of information security methods. 
In fact: “The game of science is, in principle, without end. He who decides one day that 
scientific statements do not call for any further test, and that they can be regarded as finally 
verified, retires from the game” (Popper 1985, p. 140). This paper also offers a practical 
contribution by unveiling the important limitations of the widely used security management 
approaches for practitioners. A preliminary version of the paper was presented at the Second 
Annual International Systems Security Engineering Conference (2001). 
The rest of this paper is composed as follows. The normative standard approaches are 
introduced in the second section. These standards are outlined and analyzed in the third, the 
implications of these analyses are discussed in the fourth, and the key issues are summarized 
in the fifth section. 
Normative standards  
Different management standards exist, including TCSEC/Orange Book, GMITS, CobiT, IT 
Protection Manual, BS7799, GASSP, SSE-CMM, ITSEC (1990), CTCPEC, FC, CC, TNI, 
NCSC, EPL, TDI (see Abrams & Podell 1995, Chokhani 1992, Eloff & Solms 2000a). Some 
of these are more computer system- than organization oriented, such as the Common Criteria 
and the Orange Book, and are labelled as technical (Overbeek 1995). Organization-oriented 
security standards include GMITS, BS7799 (1993, 1999), the OECD guidelines, GASSP 
(1999) and the System Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM 
1998a,b).    
These organizational oriented standards differ in level of abstraction. They vary from loose 
frameworks for security management (e.g., GMITS), to a list of security imperatives, i.e., "do 
that/don't do that" (e.g., BS7799 1993, IT Protection Manual 1996), which resemble those in 
checklists (e.g., "users should use passwords that are more than eight characters long…") that 
add security to IS in a tick-in-the-box manner (Baskerville 1993). Moreover, maturity 
standards also have a social-level role, as they present the security “maturity” level of the 
organization (Siponen 2002). 
Of these standards, we selected three - BS7799, GASSP and SSE-CMM - as examples for 
analysis on the basis of three factors. First, they are rather new; it would be unfair to criticize 
only security standards that are more than twenty years old. Second, they are widely 
(internationally) advocated by both practitioners and academic scholars. Third, their 
advocates are geographically separated. The standards are introduced below:   
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Generally Accepted Information Security Principles (GASSP) 
GASSP (1999) proposes three levels of principles: 
• pervasive (few, rarely changing) principles such as those of ethics and awareness; 
• broad functional (more detailed than pervasive) principles; and 
• detailed (most detailed) principles.  
The International Committee of GASSP includes members from more than 10 countries 
(GASSP 1999, p. 30-31) but, for reasons unknown to us, GASSP has not emerged as an 
object of discussion in academic forums, unlike BS7799 and SSE-CMM (but see the special 
issue on GASSP in Information Systems Security, vol. 8, No. 3).   
BS7799 
The 1993 version of BS7799 has received the greatest attention - and has been praised to the 
skies in various academic forums (e.g., Solms 1998). This is therefore the one chosen for the 
present analysis (although we also discuss the 1999 version where relevant). BS7799 has its 
academic advocates in Australia, South-Africa and the UK. BS7799 (1993) suggests abstract 
controls, practices or procedures that should be implemented. However, one could also use it 
for the purpose of analyzing the level of maturity of a system. In that case, a mature security 
system would be one that meets a certain amount of the principles described by standards.   
System Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM) 
SSE-CMM (1998) is used most in North America, where its roots lie. It started in 1993 as a 
NSA-sponsored endeavour to extend the Capability Maturity Model (cf., Herbsleb et al. 
1997, Paulk et al. 1993, Shere & Versel 1994) in the field of software engineering to address 
security matters. Thereafter, SSE-CMM-dedicated workshops and conferences have been 
held in North America that have aroused wide interest among practitioners. SSE-CMM is 
now a well-organized effort. It includes 22 process areas (11 security-related and 11 general 
project-oriented) and five maturity levels. The SSM-CMM can be used for 1) evaluating (the 
maturity level of) a system’s security; and 2) improving the security of systems – or, more 
precisely, their security processes. We have chosen SSE-CMM as representative of the 
various security maturity approaches as it is most well-known and it is more systematically 
developed than its “competitors” (cf., Siponen 2002). 
Management and maturity standards can be included in the category of IS security 
development methods since they are prescriptive (e.g., in relation to improving processes or 
systems); see figure 1. 
NORMATIVE STANDARDS 
Evaluation Management 
 
Maturity 
 
Figure 1. Normative standards 
BS7799, for example, is called a management standard because it provides an aid for 
managers to ensure that certain issues or aspects are "properly" taken into account. Given that 
standards suggest safeguards or countermeasures, they guide development. Hence, the label 
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“normative standards”. Maturity and management standards therefore also have a role similar 
to that of traditional development standards (e.g., checklists); see figure 1.  
The term management standard is in fact misleading since security standards present a list of 
controls/procedures at different levels of abstraction which should then be implemented. 
“Management”, however, encompasses activities that are much more complex than just the 
insertion of a list of controls suggested by the standard (cf., Bartol & Martin 1994). In fact, 
such standards do not provide any help concerning real management problems stemming 
from the application of the standard, such as managerial decision-making (cf., Baskerville & 
Siponen 2002). 
Critical Analysis of the Normative Standards 
There are four problematic assumptions commonly made in the standards: “is from ought”, 
irrationalist research process and the inference problem.  
“Is from Ought” 
The standards take certain (industrial) practices as their point of departure and suggest that 
organizations should follow these practices. Thus, the standards suggest that the actions that 
organizations should take in order to secure their IS can be derived from prevailing industrial 
practices. This can be seen in the following extracts: 
GASSP: “practices are generally accepted because they represent prevalent practice in a 
particular industry” (GASSP 1999, p. 33), and likewise the SSE-CMM ”is a compilation of 
the best-known security engineering practices” (SSE-CMM, 1998). Best-known practices 
means that security experts have achieved a consensus on what the standards should include 
(Hopkinson 2001). BS7799 is no exception: “These generally accepted controls are often 
referred to as baseline security controls, because they collectively define an industry baseline 
of good security practice” (BS7799 1993, p. 1). These statements suggest that the standards 
are constructed by observing the prevailing industrial practice. More importantly, these 
extracts indicate that the prescriptions contained in the standards are valid, simply because 
they present an existing industrial practice (e.g., consider the above passage by GASSP). 
However, this is the wrong way of doing things. The fact that something (X) can be done – or 
some organizations are doing X – does not imply that other organizations should therefore do 
X. Hence, they propose “ought” conclusions (what organizations should do) from “is” 
premises (what an organization does).  
Naive inductionism 
Normative standards are at best based on naive inductionism (cf., Chalmers 1982). They 
presume that there are certain universal solutions, i.e., solutions that are valid regardless of 
environment and situation (cf., Baskerville 1992). These solutions are first observed, e.g., in 
sales catalogues, conference proceedings or organizations. Then, at best, they are validated by 
singular observations made in a certain environment at a certain time, such as the observation 
that a certain solution (e.g., packer-filter firewall) reduced the amount of electronic break-ins 
(hacking) in a certain period of time in a given environment (example 1). This observation is 
then universalized. The weakness is that even if singular observations are reliable, it does not 
follow that they can be either generalized or universalized. This is termed “naive 
inductionism”. Consider this example with respect to generalization: "some controls [which 
the code of practice suggest] are not applicable to every IT environment and should be used 
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selectively. However, most of the controls documented are widely 
accepted..[and]…recommended good practices for all organizations" (BS7799 1993). 
With respect to universalization, BS7799 prescribes key controls, which “are either essential 
requirements…or are considered to be fundamental building blocks for information security.”  
(BS7799 1993 p. 2). BS7799 states that these controls “apply to all organizations and 
environments” (BS7799 1993, p. 2), i.e., they are universal. 
However, even if a firewall reduced hacking activities, say by 55 percent and saved a million 
dollars in a certain organization (and for that reason the particular firewall was justified), it 
does not follow that it would do the same in every organization.  
It follows from the weaknesses of “from is to ought” and naive inductionism that standards 
may not pay enough attention to organizational differences, but instead suggest that certain 
solutions or procedures are valid for each and every organization. As the example above 
shows, BS7799 falls into this trap by advising implementation of all the key controls      
At first sight GASSP and SSE-CMM seem to skirt the “universal” fallacy – the second 
“stage” of naive inductionism – better than BS7799. GASSP distinguishes between what is 
“generally accepted” and “universally accepted” and notes that “all principles may have 
exceptions” (GASSP 1999, p. 34). Thus it seems to recognize this problem but, even more 
importantly, it does not give any advice on how to recognize and make these exceptions.  
SSE-CMM seems to recognize that organizations’ security requirements differ. It does this by 
forming process areas: “The SSE-CMM does not prescribe a particular process or sequence, 
but captures practices generally observed in industry” (SSE-CMM, 1998). Closer inspection 
reveals, however, that I) the process areas are predefined and universal, so that the same 
process areas should be found and applied in every organization, and II) the five maturity 
stages are fixed in advance and universal, which gives the SSE-CMM’s maturity criterion a 
strong flavour of naive inductionism, as experts’ singular-type observations are universalized. 
This means in practice that even it were true that a few organizations improve their systems’ 
security when they increase maturity in accordance with SSE-CMM – which we do not know, 
as no proper evidence has been presented so far – it does not imply that this is valid for all 
organizations. For example, SSE-CMM may certainly advocate process areas for which a 
small organization will not have the relevant security needs. Thus, in order to follow SSE-
CMM literally, one may have to build too much security, which is costly among other things. 
The same goes for increasing the maturity level – as it may even harm the organization as 
well. Note that although the objection “of course practitioners are not stupid - one can just 
bypass this particular point” is true, in order to achieve a certain maturity level (e.g., in order 
to increase the organizations’ status in the eyes of customers and business partners), small 
organizations have to follow SSE-CMM to the letter (even though it may be totally irrelevant 
and perhaps even detrimental to them).          
Irrationalist research process  
The main reason why the existing standards may not be based even on naive inductionism is 
that the observation and underlying research processes are not considerable and the results are 
not duplicable. The authors of standards have not allowed for the possibility of checking the 
validity either of singular observations (perhaps because such information may be considered 
too sensitive), or of the underlying research process. This means that normative standards are 
ultimately based on A) "measured" results; or B), more likely, the authors' subjective 
experiences about what can be done. Consider GASSP, for example: “the principles have 
been developed on the basis of experience, reason, custom…” (GASSP 1999). 
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Both A and B are problematic. When it comes to "measuring" (A), normative standards do 
not offer exact information about the measuring process nor its results, so that its reliability 
(or objectivity) cannot be evaluated. BS7799 (1993), for example, validates the controls by 
saying that "most of the controls documented are widely accepted by large, experienced 
organizations as recommended good practices for all situations". As for the other standards 
(GASSP and SSE-CMM), we have already presented similar extracts in section 3.2.1). 
Irrationalism comes into play as it is unknown how reliable such information is. It is not 
known how such a statement (the extract from BS7799 above) is experienced. It is 
questionable whether any research method has been used to obtain the results. At least, we do 
not know what scientific research methods have been used. SSE-CMM and GASSP insinuate 
that there have been none at all. SSE-CMM states that the standard is based on experts’ 
judgments based on their personal experiences (Hopkins 2001). GASSP (1999) follows a 
similar approach: ”they [principles] become generally accepted by agreement (often tacit 
agreement) rather than formal derivation from a set of postulates or basic concepts” (GASSP 
1999, p. 33). BS7799 does not say what "accepted by large organizations" means, or on what 
criteria they regard something as “accepted” (the extract from BS7799 above). Moreover, 
there are several other questions that are left unanswered, including: Are there better 
solutions? Why is this particular solution/procedure that the checklists/normative standards 
favour better than the other possible solutions? Why it is good for all situations? 
To see what these weaknesses may mean in practice, let us return to the above example 
concerned with the efficiency of firewalls. In scientific terms, we are not certain whether the 
firewall is the only causal hypothesis in the example. It may be a case of Complex Cause, i.e., 
the effect, a reduced number of security violations, is caused by several circumstances, of 
which the firewall is only one. Given that such a situation exists – that because there are other 
causal factors that are unknown, only the firewall is recognized as the cause- leading to the 
effectiveness of firewalls being universalized or generalized, we are confronted with a 
coincidental correlation. It may be, for example, that the watchfulness of staff increased due 
to these measurements, and perhaps the activity as a whole (firewall + measuring) functioned 
as a deterrent. Or perhaps the period was just quieter generally in terms of security violations, 
etc. Both are examples of possible reasons for a reduction in security violations – and no 
attempt is made to rule out such reasons.  
The alternative (B), in which the normative standards are based on personal observations, is 
also problematic. Namely, personal feelings and experiences per se are inadequate as sources 
of validation in cases where the possibilities exist for the application of more reliable research 
approaches (Chalmers 1982), although some extreme relativists and method anarchists, such 
as Feyerabend (1964), may be ready to accept them as valid methods. First, it is difficult to 
separate our beliefs and expectations, etc. from observation, and we err. Realists (e.g., Holton 
1994, Lakatos 1970, p. 175, Metaxopoulus 1989, Musgrave 1993, Popper 1992, Niiniluoto 
1999) agree with us in this respect. Second, it is not very persuasive to answer the question 
"Why this? Why not something else?" by saying "Because I feel this way!" without any 
further information. Third, anti-realists may in any case not accept B. Even an irrational 
philosopher of science, such as Feyerabend-the-anything-goes (cf., Preston 2000, Chalmers, 
1982), would not accept the way normative standards are developed: "a crank…is not at all 
prepared to test its usefulness in all those cases which seem to favour the opponent, or even to 
admit that a problem exists. It is this further investigation, the details of it, the knowledge of 
difficulties, of the general state of the knowledge, the recognition of objections, which 
distinguishes the respectable thinker from the crank." (Feyerabend 1964, p. 305). So, to be a 
serious thinker, two conditions should be met: there must be a) a willingness to test; and b) 
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the recognition of objections. Even on Feyerabend’s criteria, the developers of standards 
seem to be more "cranks" than "respectable thinkers". They are not keen to publish their 
observations (or the data and processes behind those observations) nor to test their work 
further. Furthermore, "the recognition of objections" as a condition is not met, given that the 
checklists/normative standards do not take into account related work, not even relevant 
objections or the use of relevant research methods.  
The inference problem 
Normative standards may also involve an inference problem, which is argued to be a 
"fundamental problem in computer security" (see Garvey 1992). Consider, for example, an 
organization that builds its security using Baseline controls (as suggested by Parker 1998). 
The Baseline approach compares the safeguards of a target organization with those of its 
peers in the same industry, and if the target organization does not meet the "due care" 
standards for the industry, then these baseline controls should be implemented. The baseline 
approach is therefore similar to security management (normative) standards, in that certain 
standards should be met regardless of organizational and environmental differences. The 
inference problem may manifest itself as a person knowing the vulnerabilities of such 
controls, e.g., areas that the standards do not cover adequately, who would then know the 
weak points of organizations that use such standards (Parker 1998, p. 214-216, for example, 
has reported several issues that the GASSP standard does not cover).  
Discussion, the limitations and implications of this study  
This paper analyzed three widely used and advocated standards: BS7799, GASSP and SSE-
CMM.  
These standards succumb to the “Is-Ought” fallacy. The fact that some organizations do X 
does not imply that all organizations should do X. This is because normative security 
standards do not start by addressing the organization’s own, perhaps unique, security needs, 
but prescribe universal or general procedures advocated by security practitioners. 
Furthermore, compliance with existing practices upholds conventionalism, which is 
problematic in the long-run, given that it leads to reactionary attitudes and prevents 
innovations. Therefore, top companies wanting to use security as a competitive edge, or 
otherwise seeking innovations in terms of security, do not find normative standards very 
useful. The 1999 version of the BS7799 has moved in the right direction by stating that 
standards can be used as a starting point for developing organization-specific guidelines 
(BS7799 1999). However, using BS7799 as a starting point will not ensure that 
organizations’ specific security requirements are met (the organizations’ own security 
requirements should be the starting point). 
The normative standards seem to be based on naive inductionism by generalizing or 
universalizing a singular subjective observation. However, even if a singular observation is 
reliable, it does not guarantee that the observation can be universalized. Nevertheless, if 
normative standards, e.g., “key controls” in BS7799, were universally valid (valid in every 
organization) they would be highly falsifiable, i.e., we could put them to the test and see 
whether they would work perfectly in every organization. As already mentioned, a very small 
organization may be harmed by implementing all the controls and procedures specified in 
these three standards. It is highly questionable, for example, whether the key controls in 
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BS7799 are relevant to all situations (from a company with two PCs to large multinational 
corporations).  
Normative standards are not validated seriously enough, but rather they reflect their 
developers’ own preferences and personal experiences. Such a research process can be 
labelled irrationalist in terms of the philosophy of science, as it suggests that academically 
accepted research methods do not count for anything, but that one may instead rely on 
intuitions (e.g., Mautner 1996, p. 215). Irrationalism is highly problematic. The fact that we 
trust in our intuitions and observations in cases where more reliable research approaches 
would have been available has detrimental effects on research and practice. Research cannot 
be seriously validated on the basis of intuitions and naive inductionism - the risks from 
counting on them are too high – particularly more reliable research paradigm exits! These 
weaknesses mean in practice that we have no evidence concerning the reliability of such 
standards. In the case of a maturity standard, for example, one cannot be sure that the 
maturity level truly reflects the real security maturity of the systems. Thus any process 
improvement suggestions may not be optimal. Consequently, it is crucial to know is why X is 
done, what its real effects and implications are, and to what extent such findings can be 
generalized (if at all), etc. Current standards fail to pay any attention to these vital aspects.  
The normative standards might be confronted with an inference problem, meaning a situation 
in which a malicious person who knows that a certain organization abides by given standards 
might be able to infer areas that the standard and the organizations following it will not 
render sufficiently secure.  
Further research is needed to overcome these problems. Rigorous empirical studies over a 
wide cross-section of data are needed in which 1) neither the research process nor the results 
are secret, and 2) (all) the possible variables are considered. Thus, the authors of such 
standards should 1) try to validate their real usefulness and implications empirically, and 2) 
consider, on the basis of 1, what environments and organizations may be relevant. Scientific 
theories and research methods (see Järvinen 1997, 2000, Jenkins 1985, Galliers & Land 1987, 
Iivari 1991, Nunamaker et al. 1991, Stohr & Konsynski 1992, Henne & Moller 1995, March 
& Smith 1995), provided that they have survived scientific inspection, are in all probability 
more reliable than an individual’s personal experiences, presumptions, intuitions and 
speculations (Popper 1992, Niiniluoto 1999). Both quantitative (e.g., action research, 
interpretive field studies, interpretive case research) and qualitative studies (e.g., survey) 
forming two research streams are required. In the first stream, there is a need to study what 
security techniques and methods organizations use and what the real effects and possible 
weaknesses of these methods are in practice. The methods and techniques prescribed by 
standards should be based on such results. In the second stream, studies are needed - not just 
to study individual techniques - but the perceived usefulness, ease of use (cf., Davis 1989) as 
well as problems and implications of the utilization of whole standards in real organizations. 
Moreover, research is needed to study how these standards can be integrated into normal 
system development or management activities (Baskerville 1992). 
More care should be paid to the generalizability of the findings in particular. When 
developing new standards, it the extent to which the existing results can be generalized 
should be carefully considered; in other words, to what organizations they may have 
relevance. Put more scientifically, to avoid naive inductionism and irrationalism, it is 
suggested that probability induction within a research programme (cf., Lakatos 1970) could 
be used as the guiding foundation for developing a normative standard. Owing to this 
probability induction, empirical evidence that supports the relevance of the particular 
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checklist/normative standard in certain environments will increase the likelihood, or 
confidence, that the checklist/normative standard may be relevant in a similar environment. 
We can combine this with a hypothetical-deductive approach, such as modified versions of 
falsificationism, to perceive the limits of the standards/generalizations. We do not mean by 
this that the hypothetical-deductive process is able refute the whole relevance of a standard 
(as would be in the case with traditional Popperian falsificationism), but that it can show the 
limits of the standards/statistical generalizations. Following this idea, the development of 
standards may be seen as a research programme (cf., Lakatos 1970, Loose 1993). 
Summary 
Management (e.g., BS7799, GASSP) and maturity (e.g., SSE-CMM) standards as well as 
checklist can be regarded as development-guiding - normative – standards. Maturity and 
management standards play a similar role to that of traditional development standards such as 
checklists. The analysis of the three normative standards revealed several weaknesses. First, 
normative standards are claimed to be, if not universally valid, at least generally valid. 
Second, they are based on exploring "is" matters (what forms of protection are available, or 
what is done in other organizations), the norms (standards) for which are then universalized. 
The fallacy is that what is done in an organization does do not per se allow us to deduce what 
other organizations should do (Hume's Law "no ought from an is"). Moreover, normative 
standards are based on unjustified personal observations (derived from limited material), 
speculations and might include an inference problem. The major implication of this research 
is that normative standards in their current forms are questionable. It is suggested that the 
normative standards should favor a more reliable development philosophy instead of naive 
inductionism. A possible, and perhaps more reliable, approach would be one based on 
research programs. 
References  
Abrams, M.D., & Podell, H.J., (1995), Evaluation Issues. In: Information Security - An 
Integrated Collection of Essays, Edited by M. D. Abrams, S. Jajodia & H. J. Podell, 
IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, CA, USA.  
Bartol, K.M. & Martin, D.C., (1994), Management. International edition. McGraw-Hill, inc. 
Baskerville, R., (1992), The Developmental Duality of Information Systems Security. Journal 
of Management Systems. Vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 1-12. 
Baskerville, R., (1993), Information Systems Security Design Methods: Implications for 
Information Systems Development. Computing Surveys 25, (4) December, pp. 375-
414. 
Baskerville, R. & Siponen, M.T. (2002): An Information Security Meta-policy for Emergent 
Organizations. Journal of Logistics Information Management, special issue on 
Information Security, Vol. 5-6, pp. 337-346. 
Caplan, K. & Sanders, J.L., (1999), Building an international security standard. IT 
Professional, vol. 1, no. 2, March-April, pp. 29–34. 
Chalmers, A.F., (1982), What is this thing called science? Second edition, Open University 
Press. 
Mikko T. Siponen Information Security Management Standards 
7th Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, 10-13 July 2003, Adelaide, South Australia        Page  1559
Chokhani, S., (1992), Trusted products evaluation. Communications of the ACM. Vol. 35, 
Issue 7, pp. 64-76. 
Code of Practice for Information Security Management, (1993), Department of Trade and 
Industry. DISC PD003. British Standard Institution, London, UK. 
BS7799-1, (1999), Code of Practice for Information Security Management, Department of 
Trade and Industry. 
Davis, F., (1989), Perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, and acceptance of information 
technology. MIS Quarterly, Vol. 13, no. 3, September, pp. 319-340. 
Dhillon, G., (1997), Managing Information Systems Security. MacMillan Press LTD, UK. 
Dhillon, G. & Backhouse, J., (2001), Current directions in IS security research: toward socio-
technical perspectives. Information Systems, Vol 11, No 2.  
Eloff, M.M. & Solms, S.H., (2000a), Information Security Management: A Hierarchical 
Framework for Various Approaches. Computers & Security, Vol. 19, pp. 243-256. 
Eloff, M.M. & Solms, S.H., (2000b), Information Security: Process Evaluation and Product 
Evaluation. Sixteenth Annual Working Conference on Information Security, Beijing, 
China. 
Ferraiolo, K., & Sachs, J.E., (1996), Distinguishing Security Engineering Process Areas by 
Maturity Levels. Proceedings of the 9th Annual Canadian Information Technology 
Security Symposium.  
Ferris, J.M., (1994), Using Standards as a Security Policy Tool. ACM Standard view, vol. 2, 
no. 2, pp. 73-77. 
Feyerabend, P., (1964), Realism and Instrumentalism: Comments on the logic of Factual 
Support. In M. Bunge (eds): The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy. Free 
Press, New York, USA. 
Fitzgerald, K.J., (1995), Information security baselines. Information Management & 
Computer Security, Vol. 3 Issue 2, pp. 8-12. 
Galliers, R.D., & Land, F.F., (1987), Choosing appropriate information systems research 
methodologies. Communication of the ACM, vol. 30, no. 11, pp. 900-902.  
Garvey, T.D., (1992), The Inference Problem for Computer Security. Proceedings of the Fifth 
Computer Security Foundations Workshop. IEEE Computer Society Press. 
GASSP, (1999), Generally Accepted System Security Principles (GASSP). Version 2.0. 
Information Systems Security. June, vol. 8, no. 3.  
Hare, R. M., (1952), The Language of Morals. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. 
Hardy, G., (1995), Standards - The Need for a Common Framework. Computers & Security, 
Vol. 14, Issue 5, pp. 426-427.   
Henne, A. & Moller, E.M., (1995), Innovation in business processes-a discussion of research 
methods to study the process of innovation. Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences, Vol. V, IEEE Computer Society Press. 
Hirschheim, R., Klein, H. K., & Lyytinen, K. (1995). Information Systems Development and 
Data Modelling: Conceptual and Philosophical Foundations. Cambridge University 
Press, UK. 
Mikko T. Siponen Information Security Management Standards 
7th Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, 10-13 July 2003, Adelaide, South Australia        Page  1560
Holton, G., (1994), Science and Anti-Science. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, USA. 
Hopkinson, J.P., (2001), Security Standards Overview. Proceedings of the Second Annual 
International Systems Security Engineering Conference. 
Iivari, J., (1991), A paradigmatic analysis of contemporary schools of IS development, 
European Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 249-272. 
Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) (1990), Harmonised Criteria of 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.  
IT Baseline Protection Manual, (1996), BSI, Germany. 
Janczewski, L., (2000), Managing Security Functions Using Security Standards. In L. 
Janczewski (eds): Internet & Intranet Security Management: Risks and Solutions, Idea 
Group Publishing, USA, pp. 81-105.  
Jenkins, M.A., (1985), Research methodologies and MIS research. In E. Mumford et al. 
(eds.): research methodologies in information systems. Elsevier Science Publishers 
B.V., pp. 103-117. 
Järvinen, P., (1997), The new classification of research approaches. The IFIP Pink Summary - 
36 years of IFIP. Edited by H. Zemanek, Laxenburg, IFIP. 
Järvinen, P., (2000), Research Questions Guiding Selection of an Appropriate Research 
Method. Proceedings of the 8th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS 
2000), July 3-5, Vienna. 
Herbsleb, J., Zubrow, D., Goldenson, D., Hayes, W., Paulk, M., (1997), Software Quality and 
the Capability Model. Communications of the ACM, vol. 40, no. 6, pp. 30-40. 
Lakatos, I., (1970), Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In 
I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds): Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge 
University Press, UK. 
Loose, J., (1993), A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Third Edition, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. 
March, S.T., & Smith, G.F., (1995), Design and natural science research on information 
technology. Decision support systems, 15, pp. 251-266. 
Mautner, T., (1996), A Dictionary of Philosophy. Blackwell Publishers Ltd, Oxford, UK. 
Metaxopoulos, E., (1989), A Critical Consideration of the Lakatosian Concepts: "Mature" 
and "Immature" Science. In K. Gavroglu, Y. Goudaroulis and P. Nicolacopoulos (eds): 
Imre Lakatos and Theories of Scientific Change, pp. 203-214, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
Musgrave, A., (1993), Common Sense, Science and Sceptism. Cambridge University Press, 
UK. 
Niiniluoto, I., (1990), Science and Epistemic Values. Science Studies (3:1):21-25. 
Niiniluoto, I., (1999), Critical Scientific Realism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. 
Nunamaker, J.F., Chen, M., Purdin, T.D.M., (1991), Systems development in information 
systems research. Journal of Management Information Systems, vol. 7., no. 3., pp. 89-
106. 
Mikko T. Siponen Information Security Management Standards 
7th Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, 10-13 July 2003, Adelaide, South Australia        Page  1561
Overbeek, P.L., (1995), Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation - Update Report. 
Proceedings of the IFIP TC11 Eleventh International Conference on Information 
Security, IFIP/SEC'95. 
Parker, D. B., (1998), Fighting Computer Crime - A New Framework for Protecting 
Information. Wiley Computer Publishing. USA. 
Paulk, M.C., Curtis, B., Chrissis, M.B, Weber, C.V., (1993), Capability Maturity Model. 
Version 1.1. IEEE Software, Vol. 10, issue 4, pp. 18-27. 
Popper, K., (1985), Scientific Method. In: Popper Selections (eds): D. Miller, Princeton 
University Press, USA, pp. 133-142. 
Popper, K.R, (1992), In Search of a Better World: Lectures and Essays from Thirty Years. 
Routlege, London, UK.  
Pounder, C., (1999), The Revised version of BS7799-so what’s new? Computers & Security, 
vol. 18, issue 4, pp. 307-311.  
Preston, J., (2000), Feyerabend. In W.H. Newton-Smith (eds): A Companion to Philosophy of 
Science, Blackwell Publishers, UK, pp. 143-148. 
Shere, K.D. & Versel, M.J., (1994), Extension of the SEI software capability maturity model 
to systems. Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual International on Computer Software 
and Applications. 
Siponen, M.T., (2001), An analysis of the recent IS security development approaches: 
descriptive and prescriptive implications. In G. Dhillon (eds:) Information Security 
Management - Global Challenges in the Next Millennium. Idea Group Publications, 
Hershey, PA, USA, pp. 101-124. 
Siponen, M.T. (2002): Towards Maturity of Information Security Maturity Criteria: Six 
lessons learned from software maturity criteria. Information Management & Computer 
Security, vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 337-436. 
Solms, R., (1996), Information security management: The Second Generation. Computers & 
Security, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 281-288. 
Solms, R., (1998), Information security management (3): the Code of Practice for Information 
Security Management (BS 7799). Information Management & Computer Security. Vol. 
6, Issue 5, pp. 224-225. 
Solms, R., (1999), Information security management: why standards are important. 
Information Management and Computer Security, Vol. 7, Issue 1, pp. 50-58. 
Solms, R., & Van Der Haar, H., (2000), From Trusted Information Security Controls to a 
Trusted Information Security Environment. Information Security Sixteenth Annual 
Working Conference on Information Security, Beijing, China. 
SSE-CMM, (1998a), The Model. v2.0. http://www.sse-cmm.org. 
SSE-CMM, (1998b), The Appraisal Method. v2.0. http://www.sse-cmm.org. 
Stohr, E.A. & Konsynski, B.R., (1992), Research Approaches in ISDP. Information Systems 
and Decision processes, Stohr, E.A. & Konsynski, B.R (eds.). IEEE Computer Society 
Press, Los Alamitos, CA, USA. 
